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a contemporaneous and non-eschatological reading
(145, 150, 164). Daniel does not refer to the far distant future. Chapters 2 and 7 represent kingdoms and
situations now long past. Chapters 8 and 11 relate to
the period of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (216-164 BC)
and the Maccabean Revolt (144-8, 157-8). More particularly, the much debated passage at Daniel 7: 9-14
is seen as referring to the first advent, not the last
judgement (144).
Calvin’s humanistic training as a lawyer was formative for his approach to the biblical texts. At a pivotal point in his life he learned from teachers such
as Pierre de l’Éstoile (1480-1537) and Andrea Alciato
(1492-1550) to interpret legal sources such as the
Corpus iuris civilis of Justinian in historical terms.
These earlier legal studies were formative for the way
they shaped Calvin’s approach to the Five Books of
Moses (172-3) and the Bible generally. This is an area

in which further research would be most valuable.
Other such areas highlighted by Pitkin include the
importance of the Calvin-Melanchthon connection
(60-6) and the part played by Calvin’s view of history
in the political-legal-historical writing of François
Hotman (1524-90), whose Francogallia (1573) offered an interpretation of French history deeply respectful of Calvin’s teaching (208-18).
I first read Calvin (in translation) in 1962. My
interest in historiography dates from the same time. I
wish that I had had access to this sort of work on Calvin
back then. As to the minister whom I mentioned
earlier, I expect that this volume would have gone a
long way to addressing his misapprehensions. Indeed,
with this book Barbara Pitkin has placed those who
honor and respect the legacy of John Calvin in her
debt.

The Inevitability of Tragedy: Henry Kissinger and His World. Barry Gewen. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2020, 452pp. ISBN 978-1-324-00405-9. Reviewed by Jack R. Van
Der Slik, Professor of Political Studies and Public Affairs emeritus, University of IllinoisSpringfield.
Barry Gewin is refreshingly forthright about his
view of international politics. He opens his new book
about the American statesmen Henry Kissinger by
characterizing himself as a political “Realist” thusly:
“[I have] tried to reach conclusions based on the power relationships of a given situation. I attempted to assess how American national interest would be affected
by a particular decision and to measure what was possible, not simply desirable. To put it another way: I
thought it was important to distinguish between
what was true—Realism—and what one wished was
true. I was distrustful, even dismissive, of applying
moral considerations in a field where abstract morality did not seem especially relevant…. I certainly
didn’t believe in moral absolutes that outweighed all
other considerations, national well-being foremost
among them” (xi).
Equipped with this intellectual perspective,
Gewen chooses to differentiate “good guy-bad guy”
perspectives on American foreign relations. His heroic political realist is Henry Kissinger, definitely for
Gewen a good guy. In American politics, according
to Gewen, the quintessential bad guy was Woodrow

Wilson. The Wilsonian liberal ideal, holding out for a
golden age of freedom and democracy throughout the
world, justified a world war for democracy. As Gewen
puts it, “Wilson appealed to a mind-set that was fundamentally melodramatic and absolutist rather than
political and pragmatic….The United States was not
like other nations. It would engage in battle for the
sake of the transcendent, universal values, with confidence that God, or at least history, was on its side”
(325).
To expound and interpret Kissinger’s life and
Gewen’s Realism, Gewen traces the views of earlier intellectual interpreters of Realism: Leo Strauss, a noted
philosophy professor at the University of Chicago, and
Hannah Arendt, a secular Jewish scholar who grew
up in Germany before World War II. The common
threads of thought they shared included a skepticism
about human equality and, therefore, government imposed through democracy and equal rights. Strauss
approved of an elite rule pursuing the public good
rather than a democratic process for people primarily in pursuit of their self-interests. Arendt, a refugee
from Nazism, wrote skeptically about various dangers
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in post-war American trends, particularly the decline
of authority and disregard for tradition. She feared the
delusions of unthinking, anti-intellectual masses.
Kissinger’s closest intellectual mentor was, like
Kissinger, a Jewish refugee from Germany: Hans
Morgenthau. As Gewen details, Morgenthau was a
colleague of Strauss, a friend of Arendt, and, thereby,
an intellectual “bridge” to Kissinger. Morgenthau
escaped Germany in 1937 after the rise of Nazism.
By scholarly accomplishment he gained an appointment at the University of Chicago in 1943. Between
1946 and 1951, Morgenthau published four books
and 34 articles. He became a leading proponent of a
Realist approach to international politics. In a world
of potentially hostile relationships, Morgenthau interpreted and explained relations among the nations
according to their accumulation of and application of
power. In his view, the road to international peace (or
the absence of war) is best achieved through a balance of power. Balance can be achieved by preventing
dominance by any particular state. If violators arise,
rival states can (should) unite to reset the power balance. The Realism of power politics means that statesmen make calculated choices, not between “good and
evil,” but between “bad and less bad” (199).
The heart of Gewen’s inquiry is in the last two
chapters, “Vietnam” and “Kissinger in Power.”
Kissinger completed his doctorate at Harvard in 1954
and remained there in an academic appointment.
During the bipolar 1950s, President Eisenhower eschewed engagement in Vietnam. Willing to “pay
any price,” President Kennedy sent a number, growing into thousands, of American military “advisors”
to South Vietnam. His successor, Lyndon Johnson,
hugely upped the ante with armed forces, eventually
discrediting himself and the Democrats by failing to
save South Vietnam from its northern communist aggressors.
The 1968 presidential election brought the Nixon
administration, conspicuously including Henry
Kissinger, to the White House. Gewen points out
that “Two Realpolitikers were now in charge of
American foreign policy, with ideals, and even morality, far from the center of their thinking” (259).
Gradually and painfully, but eventually, the Realists
“Vietnamized” the war by reversing the Johnson
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numbers with withdrawals. The 550,000 Americans
in Vietnam in 1968 dwindled under Nixon to 90,000
in 1972. In October of that presidential election year,
Kissinger claimed, “Peace is at hand.”
Well, not really. After winning re-election in
November, in a burst of Nixonian impatience in
December, a “Christmas bombing” over a dozen
days brought negotiations to a head. In January
1973, the U.S. agreed to exchange prisoners and depart Vietnam. Two years later what was left of South
Vietnam fell to the communist regime. By that time
domestic politics was focused upon Watergate and
the Nixon denouement and departure from the presidency.
Gerald Ford clung to Henry Kissinger and his
Realist approach to foreign policy. Except for George
H.W. Bush, Gewen notes that Nixon’s successors,
even Trump, have mostly applied a moralistic, nationalistic perspective in foreign-policy making, not
a judicious balance-of-power pragmatism. Gewen admires Kissinger for applying power for limited, and
not absolute, ends. Gewen’s immersive book that well
describes the Cold-War world of international relations concludes with a pessimistic coda:
If doing good in the world is what you yearn for,
you aren’t cut out for foreign affairs. Maybe there is no
better way of putting all this than to say that in Henry
Kissinger’s world, the amoral world of statesmen and
diplomats, you could allow yourself few expectations.
If you were to act at all what had to be accepted was
the imperfectability of man, the unpredictability of
consequences, the prospect of arriving at no permanent solutions, the inevitability of tragedy. (393-4)
Let me respond to Gewen with a challenge founded on Christian faith with a call for our government
to do public justice. This counsel is from Our World
Belongs To God, para. 55:
Following the Prince of Peace, we are called upon
to be peacemakers, and to promote harmony and order. We call on our governments to work for peace;
we deplore the arms race and the horrors that we risk.
We call on all nations to limit their weapons to those
needed in the defense of justice and freedom. We
pledge to walk in the ways of peace, confessing that
our world belongs to God; he is our sure defense.

